The Law School Record

4

Vol. 6, NO.3

INTERNATIONAL LAW CONFERENCE
The Law School and the American
dle East Crisis; the

Conference

Society of Intetnational Law

was

held

on

the

The Middle East Crisis and
ments in International Law
By
Assistant

Legal

Quadrangles

were

in

joint sponsors of a Conference

April.

Develop

ments

to

Professor of Law

develop

the Middle East crisis

of the last few months, particularly as those developments
are connected with the actions of the United Nations. This
is a rather large order when we consider the number and
range of legal questions which have emerged from events

the

During

at

Conference.

The Suez

Case

Company
By

Affairs. Department of State

to

that

ofProperty:

Canal

talk this afternoon about

in international law related

delivered

Nationalization

CECIL OLMSTEAD

and Director
New York

I have been asked

International Law and the Mid

were

LEONARD C. MEEKER

Adviser for United Nations

on

The papers which follow

of the Middle
University

East Institute

post-World War II decade rising economic and
peoples in some of the less-developed

social demands of
areas

of the world have sometimes manifested themselves in

governmental taking of foreign-owned enterprises. In some
of these quarters the belief persists that governmental opera

in the Middle East and which have in

tion of enterprise will accelerate economic and social devel

come

opment. These

a number of instances
before the United Nations. It is also necessary to in
clude, here, constitutional developments in the United Na

tions

legally rationalized

events.

of state.

Organization itself, following on these Middle Eastern
My purpose is primarily to raise questions, knowing
that answers are difficult to reach, if attainable at all.
A catalogue of major legal issues might run as follows:

Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal valid, and
legal effects are to be attributed to it?
How were the military operations against Egypt by
Was

what

Israel, France, and
what

Great Britain

measures were to

to

be taken in

be characterized, and

oil

through

international

pipelines justified?
Does Egypt have valid claims for war damages against
Israel, France, and Great Britain? Do the decrees providing
for Egyptianization of foreign business enterprises in Egypt
give rise to justifiable international claims?
What are the rights of navigation in such waterways as
the Suez Canal, the Strait ofTiran, and the Gulf ofCAqaba?
NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL

exercises of sovereignty

talking about the Middle East crisis, a convenient
point of beginning is the nationalization of the Suez Canal
by Egypt last July. Was the action lawful and valid? Did the
compensation offered by Egypt meet the requirements of
international law? Would the nationalization be accorded
extraterritorial effect as to assets of the Suez Canal Com
pany outside Egypt? Are shipowners paying tolls to Egypt
protected from lawsuits which might be brought by the

tolls? Professor Olmstead has already
given
comprehensive view of the various legal ques
tions raised by the Suez nationalization, so I shall refer here
same

us a

to certain aspects which have particularly con
cerned the United States government.
On the question of validity, the argument has been made
that the Suez Canal is an international public utility to

only briefly

on

page 5

or acts

of a private nature, examination of the legal and
policy problems raised by nationalizations and similar tak
ings of foreign-owned holdings appears desirable. A prin
cipal focal point to be developed is the legal effect of gov

vestment

takings of properties and
by foreign enterprise pursuant to

tween

The

other interests operated
valid agreement be

a

the government and such enterprise.
history of governmental takings seems

to

be

as

long

Early takings of private property did not
typically present international problems, for in the usual
case the
property was locally owned and the sovereign took
it through the exercise of eminent domain. The doctrine of
as

recordation.

eminent domain

developed

in

an era

when international

consequence and, therefore,
the practice of
Furthermore,
foreign
eminent domain, at this early date, was limited in scope and

did

In

Continued

being

Because of the contemporary interest of both capital
exporting and capital-importing countries in foreign in

investment

company for the

as

"confiscations," have been

or

ernmental

consequence?

Was the obstruction of the Suez Canal and of the flow of

termed "nationaliza

takings, variously

tions," "expropriations,"

not

subject

was

of little

affect

or no

interests.

matter, and the character of the

sovereign

was

in

personal sovereign frequently accorded a
measure of divine
right. Even a sovereign in this historic
was
limited in the exercise of eminent do
sense, however,
main to a taking for a public purpose. Such a purpose in
deed that of

this

a

sense was one

designed

to

accomplish

a

governmental,

distinguished from proprietary, purpose. Normally, the
validity of the taking was predicated upon the payment of
fair compensation to the owner.
The first significant nationalizations of the twentieth cen
tury were those decreed by the Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic following the revolution in 1917. In im
portant respects the Russian Communist takings were
unique and marked a departure from prior practice of other
as

a
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which the ordinary rules concerning nationalization do not
apply. The history and provisions of the Constantinople
Convention of 1888 have been cited as a basis for the
proposition that the Canal was immunized by treaty from
nationalization. So far as the United States government is
concerned, it has reserved its position on this question and
indicated its disposition to try to work out a practical solution of the Canal problem which would protect the inter

policy was to place all means of produc
significant holdings of capital in the hands of the
state as an instrument for
carrying out certain political, eco
nomic, and social theories. These early Soviet confiscations
have served as the pattern for industry-wide takings de
signed to alter the economic and political bases of those

of all concerned.
International discussions prior to the outbreak of hostili
ties last fall were looking toward the conclusion of an agree
ment which would settle both the question of compensation
and the commitments regarding future operation of the
Canal. Following Egypt's rejection of proposals worked
out at London by a group of user nations, the United Na
tions Security Council on October 13, I956, adopted a
resolution-with the concurrence of Egypt-which set
forth six agreed requirements for a settlement governing
the Suez Canal. These requirements were as follows:
ests

(I)

there should be free and open transit through the Canal
overt or covert-this covers both
political

without discrimination,
and technical aspects;

(2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
(3) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the
politics of any country;
(4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by
agreement between Egypt and the users;
(5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted

to

deve1op-

ment;
Continued

on

states.

The Soviet

tion and

countries that have

World War II

come

under Communist control since

.

Before the revolution, foreign capital invested in Russia
to more than two billion rubles. This was com
pletely lost, and all private ownership of property in the

amounted

abolished. The Soviet government of
to foreigners or to Russians. This
action was accomplished by force, and, once the govern
ment proved that it was able to survive, there was little that
could be done through peaceful means to obtain redress.
Attempts were made by Russian nationals in the courts of
the United States and Britain to recover their confiscated
property which the Soviet government had sold to persons
who transported it to other forums. While there was some
early division of decision on the question of whether or not
the Soviet government obtained title, once that government
had received recognition by the states in which litigation
arose, the Soviet confiscations were brought under the
magic mantle of the "acts of state" doctrine, and all lived
ha ppil y ever after.
The second major nationalization of this century oc
curred in Mexico. By the end of the dictatorship ofDiaz in
Soviet Union

fered

no

was

compensation
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David Gooder, chairman of the Chicago Bar Association Committee on
International Law, opens the afternoon session of the Conference on In
ternational Law and the Middle East Crisis.
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of armed force. This is surely a development to be wel
comed. Once again the comparison with Korea suggests it
self In the Middle East, as in Korea, there has been no effec

for either side. An armistice is once
again
question remains how this uneasy situa
tion can be stabilized and progress be made toward a,
durable settlement.
There is a pressing need for the community of nations to
find, develop, and employ effective means to make just and
viable settlements of the problems to which force was once
applied as the solvent. Unless this is done, we cannot be
confident that the ground seemingly won will be held
that the world's hold on peace is secure. Groping efforts
toward peace with justice are discernible in the arrange
ments made by the United Nations to try to establish peace
ful conditions between Israel and Egypt. We shall have to
wait longer to judge the outcome-whether it holds real
hope because the nations of the world are determined that
their common efforts shall succeed or whether some new
beginnings must be made.
The web of history is slowly woven.

Lloyd, JD 23, speaking to the annual Alumni Luncheon in the
Law Library. Mr. Lloyd, past president of The Law School Alumni
Association, is Chairman of the Board oj Trustees of the University.
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law was
confirmed by

passed whereby the concessions were to be
"issuing," not "granting," confirmatory con

cessions without limitation of time. The

all the land in Mexico was owned by
some one thousand powerful families. Article 27 of the 1917
constitution laid the foundation for agrarian reform and the
expropriation of foreign-held land and oil interests. It gave
onl y Mexicans, or foreigners who were by special agree
ment to be treated as Mexicans without recourse to their
19II

(1877-19II)

governments, the right to acquire ownership in or ex
ploit Mexican natural resources. The constitution further
provided for expropriation of private property tor reasons
of public utility. Confiscations were forbidden. In I923 the
United States accepted compensation in the form of federal
bonds for certain lands, and a commission was set up to
adjudicate claims, though it never settled any. By 1938 the
Mexican government had "nationalized" moderate-sized
holdings estimated by their United States owners to be
worth ten million dollars. Three million dollars was finally
paid by Mexico to satisfy these claims.
Parallel to the land questions, though handled separately
and raising different legal problems, was the expropriation
of oil rights that had been granted to various foreign com
panies prior to I9I9. At that time the owner of the surface
had right to the subsurface minerals. Article 27 vested the
nation with all the subsurface rights, but it was held not to
be retroactive in effect. Mexico tried to restrict the length of
own

time that the

foreign concessions could run to fifty years by
by concessions
which would be granted by the Mexican government.
Long diplomatic correspondence followed, and the law was
finally declared unconstitutional in certain parts in 1927. A
requiring

that the concessions be confirmed

question then
until
when
President
I936,
years,
Cardenas had carried the agrarian reform near completion
and turned his attention to other matters. On March 18,
seemed settled for

some

1938, the Labor Board declared all oil-company labor con
canceled, and President Cardenas signed the expropri
ation decree expropriating the foreign oil companies' inter
tracts

in Mexico.

ests

The expropriation had its immediate

origin

in

a

labor

controversy but was really an expression of the second ob
jective of the Mexican revolution, the "Mexicanization of
industry." The expropriation of oil, unlike the expropria
tion
as

ofland, did

only

the

not

affect Mexican and foreigner equally,
oil interests were nationalized. The

foreign
recognized

United States
ate

the oil

resources

but,

the
as

right

of Mexico

in the land

to

question,

expropri
demanded

that prompt and just payment be made. Mexico had argued
in the land question that all the foreigner could ask was

equality

of treatment with the national but admitted liabil

ity to compensate. The issue Was finally resolved in a similar
fashion to the land question.
It is significant to note that, so far as the oil expropria
tions

were

concerned,

agreements with oil

Mexico breached valid concession

companies

in this and other countries.

But, recognizing a "sovereign" power in Mexico to ter
minate the agreements, the United States government
pressed only for compensation and did not question the
basic abrogation of contractual obligations by the govern
ment.
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The

next act

of the

play

was

the action

by

the Iranian

government in I95I in nationalizing the oil industry in
Iran. This was of a pattern similar to that of the Egyptian

taking

of the Suez Canal

Company operated

Company. The Anglo-Iranian Oil
industry in Iran pursuant to a

the oil

from canal transit would be used by Egypt for construction
of the Aswan dam. This announced purpose was obviously
to accelerate the economic development of Egypt. How
ever, there were also apparent political overtones. To main
tain his

position of prestige in the Arab world and twister

unexpired agreement with the government when
the Iranian parliament enacted legislation nationalizing the

the lion's tail, it

company. Offers of the company to arbitrate the dispute
under terms of the agreement were refused on the ground
that Iran, as a nation, had a sovereign right to nationalize

offer.

valid and

within its territories. Britain

properties
that

this action Iran

by
obligation

and

was

appealed

to

breaking

a

strongly contended
binding contractual

the International Court of Jus

tice, which, after issuing a temporary restraining order, de
cided in I952 that it lacked jurisdiction.

jurisdiction of the court depended on the declara
by the parties under Article 36(2) of its statute.
The court was of the opinion, as Iran argued, that the com
pulsory jurisdiction attached only to disputes arising out of
conventions or treaties accepted by Iran after the signing of
the declaration. The British argued that disputes arising out
The

tions made

of "situations or facts" prior to the declaration were within
the compulsory jurisdiction, since they based jurisdiction on
The

Iran before I932.

accepted by
Anglo-Iranian case involved

certain treaties

circumstances that characterize the

many of the facts and
principal problem of

and
contemporary concern. Iran, a country with a valuable
with a
contracted
had
natural
essential
resource,
perhaps
Western company for the operation of the oil industry
within its territory. The company made substantial invest
ments of capital and technique in the development of Iran

was

ot

essential that Colonel Nasser undertake

spectacular action following withdrawal of the Aswan Dam
The
Canal

original concession for the construction of the Suez
granted by the viceroy of Egypt to Ferdinand de

was

Lesseps,

a

Frenchman,

in

I854. He

was

directed

to

organize

company to build the Canal. Use of the Canal com
menced in I869, and the term of the concession was for
a

ninety-nine

years from that

date,

at

the end of which it

was

upon indemnification of the company.
The distribution of net profits was divided I5 per cent to the
Egyptian government, 75 per cent to the company, and IO
to revert to

Egypt

cent to the founders.
The Convention of I866, between the viceroy and the
company, under which the Canal was operated, provided
that the company was Egyptian and was to be governed by
the laws and customs of Egypt. On the other hand, as re

per

gards its constitution as a corporation and the relations of its
partners with one another, it is governed by the laws of
France that govern joint-stock companies. Disputes be
tween Egypt and the company were placed under the juris
diction of the

Egyptian

courts.

principal maritime states using the Canal
entered into the Constantinople Convention concerning
free navigation in the Suez Canal. The states party agreed
that the Canal shall always be free and open in time of war
In I888 the

and its oil fields. Motivated by a nationalistic zenophobia
and demands for accelerated proceeds from the principal
enterprise in the country, the Iranian government took the

as in time of
peace to both commercial and naval vessels
without distinction as to flag. This convention takes note of
the earlier concession to the Canal Company, but the dura

foreign-owned enterprise as an act within its "sovereignty."
The near-bankruptcy of Iran, only prevented by extraordi
the period
nary aid measures of the United States during
between nationalization and settlement of the dispute, indi
cates the dependence of such countries upon the technical
skill and capital resources of the more-developed countries

tion of the former

of the West.
The announced nationalization of the Universal Suez
Maritime Canal Company in July, I956, posed legal, eco
nomic, and policy problems that raise all the issues con
nected with investments pursuant to agreements between
business

organizations

in countries of more-developed

eco

nomic systems and governments of less-developed coun
tries. President Nasser declared that stockholders of the

limited

was not

obligations under the concession.
Abrogation of the contractual agreement with the Suez
Canal Company presents the legal question of the right of a

state

under international law

eign

or

persons
viduals. The latter

veils

are

frequently

Nationalization of the company closely followed United
States and British withdrawal of earlier offers to help Egypt

property

nouncing

dam at Aswan on the Nile. In his speech an
the nationalization, Nasser declared the revenues

contracts

with for

by foreign indi
problem, as corporate

presents
lifted to determine the real

the Suez Canal is within its

position

breach its
no

case

alization.

The

to

with local entities owned

interest.

high

the ninety-nine-year

formed its

company would be compensated at the prevailing price of
the stock on the Paris Bourse on the day preceding nation

build the

by

of the latter. When this convention came into force,
Egypt was under Ottoman suzerainty and not a party, but,
later, after obtaining its independence, Egypt affirmed ad
herence to it. At the time of nationalization the concession
had some twelve years of its term to run, and there is no
indication that the Canal Company had not faithfully per
term

advanced

by spokesmen
territory

parties

in

for Egypt is that
taking of

and that the

the territorial sovereign, even though foreign
owned, is a valid exercise of jurisdiction by the sovereign,
particularly as compensation is offered.
Several arguments have been advanced in opposition to

by

The
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of the nationalization. It is contended that the
the Suez Canal Company is a part of the
Constantinople Convention and that, therefore, the abroga
tion of the concession is a violation of a treaty-a recognized
breach of international law. Egypt has sought to separate
the con vention from the concession, contending that none
of the obligations affects its sovereignty but that it will abide
by the terms of the convention. It is difficult to find an in
the

developed

validity

concession

..

by the convention even
though it refers to it and in the preamble speaks of the com
pletion of "the system under which the navigation of this
canal has been placed." To buttress this position, claims are
made that the spirit of the convention negates ownership
and-control by anyone nation. An attempted incorporation
by reference would undoubtedly fail because of the in
concession

definiteness of the reference and because the ultimate
sion of the Canal

ownership

and

rebuts any inference

Egypt
operation by anyone country.
to

rever

against

In the

case of the Suez Canal a
strong argument can be
the line that it is a unique international public utility
of vital concern to the world community and, therefore,
beyond the capacity of any single state's jurisdiction to na
tionalize. Perhaps, in the case of Suez this is a valid char
acterization. Certainly the doctrine of eminent domain
that is, a taking for a public purpose by a sovereign-would

along

not

apply

where the

munity and, hence,
one state--even

Valid

interest is that of the world

public
not properly

the territorial

to

be determined

com

by

any

sovereign.

the proposed measure of
of the stock on the day
nationalization. The traditional doctrine runs that a

objection can be taken to
compensation-the market value
prior to
state

may nationalize the property of foreigners

provided

it

makes

"adequate, effective and prompt compensation," and
unfortunately this has usually been acceptable to the United
Department of State as a validating principle. Assum
the validity of this formula, the price of the stock does

States

ing
not

31

countries of the world has been

to

stimulate and

capital for purposes of indus
trial development from developed to underdeveloped coun
tries. A necessary condition for fulfilment of this objective is
the creation of confidence on the part of potential investors.
Arbitrary abrogation of contracts by governments seeking
to benefit from
foreign investment does not establish an

encourage the flow of private

to

corporation of the

Law School

necessarily to constitute adequate compensation.
damages rules under both common and civil
systems are designed to compensate the injured party

appear

Measure of

law
for his losses under the broken contract-and this does not
mean
upon a quantum meruit basis. Therefore, payment for
all properties taken plus future lost profits would represent
adequate compensation. Of course, prompt payment of
such a measure is far beyond the financial capabilities of
Egypt. Furthermore, if full damages were paid by the na
tionalizing state to the victim of the expropriation, there
could be no financial gain to the state and no incentive to
nationalize.
While of importance, I submit that these arguments do
not reach the policy and
legal heart of the problems raised
the
nationalization
of
by
foreign-held enterprise operated
pursuant to a contractual agreement with the government
of the host state.
An announced major policy objective of the government
of the United States, of the United Nations, and of the less-

appropriate climate for investment.
The basic premise upon which rests the theory that states

disregard their agreements with individuals is the
antiquated notion that only states are subjects of interna
tionallawand that individuals are mere objects. This is no
longer factually correct, as Philip Jessup has so well demon
may

strated in his

recent Transnational Law. Furthermore, to as
that these nationalizations of foreign enterprise are only
exercises of eminent domain by the sovereign and subject to

sert

finding of public interest is a serious confusion of the rule
and the facts to which it is
apJ?lied. The doctrine of eminent
domain has always been limited to a taking for a public
purpose, defined as a governmental as distinguished from a
its

A sovereign, at the time of the formu
lation of the concept of eminent domain, was an absolute
one sometimes identified with a divine
being. While a lim
ited right of eminent domain is recognized, it should not be

proprietary purpose.

extended
ernments

include takings of all types of property by gov
that have by agreement undertaken to respect

to

certain

foreign interests.
Beyond this is the duty of any party to perform its obli
gations under a valid contractual agreement. N otwithstand
ing the Holmesian homily that a party to a contract has the
option of performance or nonperformance, it appears that
breach of a contract is not legally sanctioned conduct but is
legally condemned, and the law seeks to place the injured
party in the

position he would have

been in had the other
obvious
element of sanc
party performed-this
tion. This reasoning has long been applied, under the
maxim pacta sunc servanda, to agreements between states,
and states have enforced it between their nationals. It seems
incongruous for the states of the world community not to
apply this same standard to their own agreements with indi
viduals.
The binding effect of a state's agreements upon it should
not be viewed as a restriction or limitation
upon its sov
on the other hand, the
but,
ereignty,
entry into, and per
formance of, contractual obligations is in reality an exercise
of a sovereign personality.
contains

an

today's world community that is characterized by in
terdependence rather than independence nineteenth-cen
tury concepts of sovereignty and nationalism must give way
to concepts of state
responsibility and co-operation for the
of
all.
It
is essential that countries of the West,
well-being
the
United
States, and underdeveloped areas
particularly
establish modus operandi for trade and investment. A corner
In

stone

of this pattern must be the
and individuals.

tween states

sanctity of contracts

be

